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Abstract
In studies on the influence of contextual factors on women’s employment in the Middle 
East, two myths figure regularly, which both seems to be related to the disentanglement 
of micro and macro levels. By applying a more comprehensive view and using multilevel 
models, we provide a more nuanced view of the relationship between the contextual and 
individual level regarding women’s non-agricultural employment in Egypt and Jordan. 
First, we show that large uniform contextual processes such as globalization and 
modernization are not satisfying in explaining women’s employment. The processes are 
more complex. Egypt and Jordan seem to modernize rather linearly, but if  we look more 
closely at the processes and also take individual-level data in to account, women’s 
employment does not show the same pattern. Globalization and modernization are no 
panacea to gender equality. Second, we focus on the myth of ‘micro-level stability’ and 
have shown that the effect of individual and household factors has changed over time. 
The influence of education, the most important explanatory factor of women’s non- 
agricultural employment, has a declining effect. Furthermore, having (young) children 
seems to become a less restricting influence on women’s employment.
Draft versions of this paper are presented at the 7th Middle East Economics Association, 
29th-31st May 2008, Famagusta, North Cyprus and the Arab Thought Forum/Centre for 
International Business and Innovation conference on Globalization in the Arab World, 
3rd-4th February 2008, Amman, Jordan. We thank the participations of these conferences 
for the useful comments. We are grateful to Ellen Webbink and Janine Huisman (Dep. of 
Economics, Radboud University Nijmegen) for their part in building the database used.
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Introduction
Scholars exploring women’s employment in the Middle East often focus on the context 
these women live in (e.g. Bahramitash, 2003; Hijab, 2001; Miles, 2002; Moghadam, 
2003; Tansel, 2002; UNDP, 2005). However, to understand the importance of context, 
micro- and macro-level factors should be considered together (see Spierings & Smits, 
2007; Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2002). In this paper, we set out to deepen our 
knowledge of the effects of the economic, political and social context and to surpass two 
myths about Arab women’s employment.
First, we will zoom in on the myth of major change. Several theories focusing on 
women’s position could be called grand theories: they formulate a generally applicable 
idea on how some process that has been taking place for several decades improves 
women’s position (Hakim, 1995). These processes are often seen as single contextual 
forces leading to gender equality and rising employment, no matter what (Chen, 1999; 
Meyer, 2002; Posusney & Doumato, 2003; Scholte, 2001; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 
2008). The two most notable examples of this are the related concepts of modernization 
and globalization (see Cheng, 1999). However, the absence of a steadily rising trend in 
Middle Eastern women’s employment indicates the indicators the limitations of this 
perception of reality.
Evidently, globalization and modernization are part of the context in which women 
live and thus they influence women one way or the other (e.g. Beneria, 2003; Brand, 
2003; Posusney & Doumato, 2003; Pyle & Ward, 2003; Walby, 1996), but we argue that 
the impact they have is not univocal. As Moghadam says: “globalization has given rise to 
contradictory tendencies and trends” (2007, p.2).
Second, we focus on the myth of micro-level stability. Studies focusing on micro­
level factors have contributed much to the knowledge on what are the determinants of 
women’s employment, such as education (Gündüz-Hosgör & Smits, 2008; Lincove,
2005; Pettit & Hook, 2005; Spierings & Smits, 2007). However, we know relatively little 
about how for instance the effect of educational attainment differs by (geographical or 
temporal) context. It often seems assumed that effects at the micro-level are rather stable 
regarding their importance and size.
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Contradictory to this assumption, we hypothesize that not only women’s employment 
is influenced by its context, but also the relationships at the micro-level are. This means 
that contextual processes, such as globalization and modernization, influence the 
magnitude of the determinants of women’s employment. For example, the returns to 
education might decline when labor markets change and employers request new skills, 
while the educational system does not adapt (Spierings & Smits, 2007).
To emasculate these two myths and gain more insight into Middle Eastern women’s 
employment and contextual effects, we apply multilevel modeling to data on over 60,000 
women from the DHS Surveys of Egypt (1992, 2000, 2005) and Jordan (1990, 1997,
2002). First, these data enable us to see whether continuous processes of modernization 
and globalization have been taking place in Egypt and Jordan. Second, by combining 
these datasets, we have over 100 measurements at the sub-national level. By combining 
those with the micro-level factors in multilevel models, we can test the influences of 
contextual factors related to globalization and modernization more systematically and 
robustly. Additionally, the inclusion of micro-level variables gives us better insight into 
the mechanisms through which the contextual factors affect women’s employment. Third, 
we include cross-level interaction terms to test whether influences have significantly 
changed over time. Whereas our model include sub-national macro-level determinants, 
the (intern)national context should not be ignored, therefore we embed the statistical 
results in a description of the political and economic processes Egypt and Jordan have 
gone through the last two decades.
Theoretical framework
Since women’s non-agricultural and women’s agricultural employment have quite 
distinct dynamics (Bullock, 1994; Glick & Sahn, 2005; Gündüz-Hosgör & Smits, 2008; 
Nassar, 2003), here we focus on women’s non-agricultural employment. Arguably, this is 
the most important form of employment for women’s empowerment in today’s society, 
where the agricultural sector seems to decline day by day (Bullock, 1994; Moghadam, 
2007).
1. The myth of major change
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Globalization and modernization are two of the most notorious contextual processes 
influencing women’s employment. The causal reasoning behind them strongly overlaps 
(Abu-Radia Queder, 2007). Several theorists argue that overall globalization leads to 
higher levels of women’s non-agricultural employment. Industrialization, economic 
liberalization and a shift towards secular values drive women to enter the paid labor 
force; job opportunities are created and cultural barriers overcome (Jaquette, 1992; 
Posusney & Doumate, 2003; see for example Inglehart, 1997, Inglehart & Norris, 2003; 
Krugman & Obstfeld, 2003, Lerner, 1966; Meyer, 2003). Is sum, globalization and 
modernization are said to lead unequivocally to a better position of women.
This view leaves little room for counter(re)actions and depicts the process as a single 
driving force; however, modernization and globalization should be seen as 
multidimensional processes with multiple causal mechanisms (see Arjomand, 2004; 
Bergeron, 2001; Moghadam, 2007; Pyle & Ward, 2003). For example, globalization is 
described in terms of liberalization, westernization, universalization, deterritorialization, 
and internationalization (Scholte 2001, see also Moghadam, 2007). Modernization is 
linked to processes of industrialization, economic liberalization, value shifts away from 
traditionalism, democratisation, and economic development (Inglehart, 1997; Moghadam, 
2007; Posusney & Doumato, 2003).
We expect that not all dimensions are of the same importance. In addition, we expect 
to find contradictory influences for the different factors related to them. To gain insight in 
this complexity, we shall zoom in on different factors found in the causal processes of 
modernization and globalization.
a. Political liberalization 
Political liberalization creates opportunities for women and women’s movements to 
influence policies and demand more equality. Either women can elect (some) 
representatives in favor of their views, or incumbents will listen to them because they 
will not be re-elected when too many people (women in this case) are dissatisfied. This is 
expected to bring about gender friendly policies, which will create more opportunities for 
women, and societal norms restricting women’s employment become less dominant 
(Huber, Reuschemeyer & Stephens 1997; Posusney & Doumato 2003; Rathgeber 1990; 
Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2008; Yousef 2004).
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b. Economic reform
Several Middle Eastern countries have received loans of the IMF and World Bank, which 
in return demand structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Economic privatization and 
economic liberalization are part of these SAPs.
Privatization: SAPs entail, amongst others, cuts in expenditures and shrinking down 
public sectors to reduce budget deficits, and opening up the economy for private 
entrepreneurs to increase economic development. In most Middle Eastern countries, 
horizontal job segregation has led to a feminized public/governmental sector, because of 
better facilities for women and less gender discrimination in those sectors. Dismantling 
the public sector then disproportionately decreases women’s opportunities (Amin & Al­
Bassusi, 2004; Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Hijab, 1988, 2001; Moghadam, 1990, 1998; 
Nassar, 2003; Pyle & Ward, 2003; Posusney & Doumato, 2003; UNDP RBAS, 2006; 
Yousef, 2004).
Liberalization: Protagonists of the SAPs focus on the infusion of the developing 
economies by transnational companies which replace their production facilities to 
countries with low labor cost and less protection for employees. Especially women, with 
their “nimble fingers” and docile attitudes, are expected to benefit from this, because they 
are considered better suited for most of these new jobs (Bergeron, 2001; Clark, 1992; 
Pfeifer & Posusney, 2003; Walby, 1996).
More generally, of both privatization and liberalization it is said that they foster 
economic development, which will be discussed below.
c. Industrialization
In the broad sense industrialization means occupational specialization, growing 
organizational complexity and rising educational levels, which altogether make women 
enter the (non-agricultural) labor market (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; 
Inglehart & Norris, 2003). In a more narrow sense, it indicates the decline of the 
agricultural sector in favor of the industrial sector. Following this phase of 
industrialization, the service sector expands during what is called postmodernization 
(Inglehart, 1997). A decline of the agricultural sector decreases women’s opportunities, 
since many women in developing countries are active in agriculture. However, with 
regard to women’s non-agricultural employment, the relative decline of the agricultural
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sector favors women, because more non-agricultural jobs become available and more 
women can get employed. Following industrialization, growth of the service sector and 
the number of white collar jobs benefits women even more; society considers these jobs 
better suited for women compared to manual labor in the industrial sector (Amin & Al­
Bassusi, 2004; Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Hijab, 2001; Moghadam, 1990).
d. Economic development
In general economic development is often seen as the main indicator of modernization, 
but this does not say anything about the (causal) influence of economic development. 
Economic development creates an extra demand of labor, which directly increases 
women’s opportunities. In addition, it indirectly affects employment through increasing 
educational levels, changing value patterns and the declining fertility rates since children 
are less needed as an old-age provision (see Cairoli, 2007; Gündüz-Hosgör & Smits,
2007; Olmsted, 2003).
e. Urbanization
When families and women move to more urbanized areas or when rural areas become 
more urbanized, it is easier for women to find a job, since labor is demanded in the 
vicinity (Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Spierings & Smits, 2007). Besides this, social and family 
networks become less tight in more urban surrounding and people are often more 
dependent on themselves regarding their subsistence; declining traditional values lower 
cultural barriers to enter the labor market, and increasing needs to provide for an income 
pushes women into employment (Amawi, 2007).
f. Value change
Changing societal norms are interrelated with many of the processes discussed above. 
Two important shifts can be expected. First, traditional values shift to modern or secular 
values. The role of the traditionally large family as mainstay of society declines and 
individualization takes place. Since women are the main caretakers in society, they 
benefit most from this shift; they become less tied down to the household.
Second, the importance of traditional authority declines while rationalism and merits 
become more important. This could lead to less direct gender-based discrimination of 
women: getting educated and having a job becomes easier and more accepted (Spierings 
& Smits, 2007; cf. Inglehart, 1997; Lenski & Nolan, 1984)
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2. The myth of micro-level stability
At the micro level, we find many micro-level factors influencing women’s employment 
chances. Several studies on these micro-level factors exist and they tell us, for example, 
that education is one of the most important determinants of Middle Eastern women’s 
employment. But what shapes the magnitude of these is hardly known. In the literature it 
seems to be assumed that these relationships are rather stable and of about the same 
strength everywhere and at every moment of time (notable exceptions are Assaad 2003; 
Rani & Schmid 2007; Spierings & Smits, 2007).
In this paper, we expect the micro-level factors to show different influence according 
to their spatial and temporal context in which they are embedded (see Spierings & Smits,
2007). To gain some understanding of these processes, we formulate two general 
expectations about how globalization and modernization could influence the effects on 
women’s employment. Since the literature contains few ideas on these very general 
relationships, we also focus on two ideas from the literature regarding the effects of 
educational attainment and how this could change due to globalization/modernization.
It can be expected that in politically more liberal surroundings, the individual and 
household are emphasized more in comparison to the collective or state level. Since a 
democratic system leaves less room for authoritarian values, communal norms and needs 
could become less important in comparison to the preferences and choices of individuals 
and households. The system will leave more room for diversity and choice. This would 
mean that the effects of individual- and household-level factors grow, if political 
liberalization has taken place.
To modernization, and especially the associated value change, a similar reasoning is 
applicable. At the moment the value patterns shift away from traditionalism, more room 
will be created for women’s individual choices. The emphasis on traditional family- 
values will decrease, and we may expect that restricting factors such as a husband’s view 
or the presence of children becomes less important, whereas for example the influence of 
women’s own values and education will increase.
Regarding modernization and education, Abu Lughod’s Middle Eastern field research 
indicates that in this process educational levels of women do indeed rise, but that its
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effect on employment might decrease. This has to do with the concept of ideal wifehood, 
which seems to modernize, but in a hybrid way. The preferred wife is ‘modern’, 
‘scientific’ and educated, but in the traditional societal framework these qualities are seen 
as beneficial to the role as mother and care taker. The principal duty of women remains 
running the household. If this hybrid modernization has taken place, the effect of 
education on women’s employment should have declined.
Labor market restructuring is the second factor of which it is said that it could lead to 
lower returns to education. Since different skills are needed for being a civil servant than 
being employed in the industrial sector, economic liberalization and privatization could 
lead to a shift in skills employers seek. If the educational system does not mirror the 
changes in the labor market, education gives women fewer opportunities than before and 
consequently the effect of being educated decreases (see Assaad, 2003; Clark, 1992; 
Yousef, 2004).
Clearly, this overview of interaction effects does not exhaust all possibilities. Well 
articulated ideas on interactions are a scarcity. Above we formulated some to illustrate 
our main point that effects can differ by their context. Below, the specific changes in 
effects are given more attention where we come across them.
Data & Methods
We pool six datasets with individual- and district-level data and apply multilevel 
regression modeling. First, the pooling allows us to asses the causal pathways of district- 
level determinants, since we have 105 unique measurements at that level.1 Second, the 
inclusion of micro-level factors enables us to control for compositional effects. Third, 
including three datasets for each country makes it possible to test whether differences 
between countries or years exist and whether they are significant (see Jaccard 2001).
The datasets are Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS): national representative 
(clustered) samples of households. For Egypt we use the surveys for 2005, 2000 and 
1992, and for Jordan the 2002, 1997 and 1990 data are used. In total, the surveys contain 
information on 62,926 (ever married) women aged 15 to 49, living in 105 districts (the
1 R o b u s t o r  ‘san d w ich ed ’ s tan d a rd  erro rs  w ere  u sed , in  o rd e r  to  c o n tro l fo r  a u to co rre la tio n , since the  u se  o f  th re e  surveys fo r  each  co u n try  
m ean s  th a t w e have 3 m e a su re m e n t fo r  each  d is tr ic t (see A llison , 1999).
W eigh ts  are u sed  as su p p lied  b y  D H S , c o rre c te d  fo r  d if fe re n t sam ple size; each  sam ple w as w eig h ted  so th a t th e  n u m b e r  o f  w e ig h ted  
re s p o n d e n ts  equa led  th e  n u m b e r  o f  re sp o n d e n ts  o f  th e  sm allest sam ple (5.266).
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administrative province-level units). After resolving missing data issues, 61,620 cases 
(98%) remained. More detailed information on the data can be found in Appendix A.
The macro level is divided in a national- and a district-level context. The statistical 
analyses, including district- and micro-level factors, are embedded in qualitative 
descriptions of the economic and political developments at the country level.
The country-level developments and events are derived from an examination of the 
literature on Egypt and Jordan. In correspondence with our theoretical framework, we 
focus on developments and ‘shocks’ regarding economic liberalization and privatization, 
and political liberalization in Egypt and Jordan from the end of the 1980’s to the past few 
years. Economic liberalization is defined as opening up the market for foreign investors 
and decreasing state regulation. Economic privatization is associated with the shift from 
public-owned companies and public employment towards private-owned companies and 
private employment. Liberalization in the political sphere entails increased popular 
political participation and opening up the governmental structure of decision-making and 
an increase in de jure and de facto freedom of speech and association.
At the district level, we aggregated data to include six variables measuring the 
theoretical factors industrialization, economic development, urbanization and value 
change. Regarding industrialization, we measured the percentage of men older than 25 
working in agriculture and the size of the white collar sector was measured by the 
percentage of women and men with a non-manual job as a percentage of all employed 
people. To measure economic development we took the mean of the standardized 
percentages of households in a district that possessed a car, a refrigerator, a television, 
had access to electricity and had running water. The percentage of people living in a city 
reflects the degree of urbanization. For values we used two constructs. The first is the 
gender ratio in secondary or higher education. Second, we created a scale of 
traditionalism by taking the mean of the standardized values of the percentage of 
households including polygynous marriages, the percentage of households with extended 
families, and the average household size.
At the micro level we included the most important variables identified by previous 
research (Spierings & Smits, 2007; see also: Aromolaran, 2004; Assaad & Arntz, 2005; 
Glass & Nath, 2006; Gündüz-Hosgör & Smits, 2008; Hakim, 2002; Hijab, 2001; Joseph
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& Slyomovics, 2001; Lincove, 2005; Pettit & Hook, 2005): educational attainment, 
marital status, number and age o f children, household care ratio, occupation o f the 
partner, living in a city, age at delivery o f the woman ’s firstborn, couple ’s age difference, 
partner ’s educational attainment, polygynous household, extendedfamily, and age. For 
more information see appendix B.
To test how the influences of these micro-level variables have changed, we included 
interaction terms of these with dummies for the different years of the different countries. 
With Chi-squares we tested whether the coefficient differ significantly from each other 
(p<0.05).2
The economic and political context
Egypt
State control is the buzzword for Egypt during Nasser’s (president from 1954 to 1970) 
Arab Socialism. Economically this meant state led development (Jamal 2006; Mitchell 
2001; Pfeifer & Posusney 2003), and politically it is associated with the ‘authoritarian 
bargain’ as Yousef (2004) calls it; political participation was restricted, but the people 
accepted this in trade for economic security and social services. After succeeding Nasser, 
Sadat (1970-1981) made some steps towards liberalization. Allegiance switched from the 
SU to the US, a multiparty system was allowed, Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) were 
encouraged, and the policy of infitah “opened” the economy to some extent (Assaad & 
Arntz 2005; Mitchell 2001; Owen 2000). Throughout Sadat’s reign, governmental 
employment and occupational participation rates of women were relatively high 
(Moghadam 1998).
In the early eighties, the first oil boom stimulated the economy and financially 
supported government expenditures (Yousef 2004). Many men, especially the ones 
working in agriculture, went to work abroad and in Egypt many women filled in the 
vacancies (Nassar 2003; Pfeifer & Posusney 2003).
At the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s the economic situation changed. The 
end of the Gulf War led to the return of migrants from Iraq in 1991. After 1985 the oil
2 A ll variab les are c e n tre d  a ro u n d  th e ir  m e an  so th a t th e  m a in -e ffec t coe ffic ien ts  resem b le  th e  effec ts  fo r th e  average w o m en . 
C o n seq u en tly , th e  in te rac tio n  coe ffic ien ts  sh o u ld  n o t b e  sim ply  a d d e d  to  o r  su b trac ted  fro m  the  re p o rte d  m a in  coefficien ts .
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prices collapsed and the international economic environment became more competitive 
(Assaad & Arntz 2005; Moghadam 1998; Yousef 2004). Unemployment and poverty 
increased during these years (Assaad 2003; Moghadam 1998; Nassar 2003), and loans 
were needed to refinance obligations, for example caused by arms purchases during the 
past war with Israel (1973) (Mitchell 2001). Consequently, structural reforms were 
implemented; the first starting officially in 1987 (Kienle 1998; Nassar 2003). The 
continuous shocks led to new and more substantial structural reforms (SAPs) in 1991 and 
1996: from a state-led to a market, privatized and outward oriented economy (Assaad
2003, Assaad & Arntz 2005; Moghadam 1998; Pfeiffer & Posusney 2003; Yousef 2004).
To secure popular support for the economic reforms in early 1990s, Mubarak 
encouraged the opposition to participate in the political process (Owen 2000; Yousef 
2004). However, under suppression several groups had turned radical, and Mubarak tried 
to isolate the extreme offshoots of the Muslim brotherhood (Owen 2000). In the 1990 
elections, all remaining barriers to independent candidates were removed but government 
could still constrain activities in the electoral campaign and the Muslim brotherhood was 
prohibited to run as a party. Tensions rose, resulting in political violence, such as the
1991 attacks on tourist sights -  ‘a symbol of Egypt’s corruption by the W est’ (Mitchell 
2001: 237). Consequently, the tourist sector revenues declined (Assaad & Arntz 2005; 
Moghadam 1998; Yousef 2004), and in combination with volatile oil prices, incomplete 
reforms, cuts in the government budget to reduce deficits, and rapid labor force growth 
(fertility and repatriating expatriate workers), this put severe stress on the economy and 
withheld it from taking of in the first half of the1990s (Assaad & Arntz 2005, Kienle 
1998; Mitchell 2001; Owen 2000; Yousef 2004).
After the rise in political violence, Mubarak started a policy of a more general attack 
on all religious organizations, labeling them as terrorists (Kienle 1998; Owen 2000). 
During the mid-1990s political and economic liberalization did not go hand in hand 
anymore. Kienle (1998) speaks of the political deliberalization in the late 1990s, and 
religio-cultural struggles intensified (Owen 2000). However or consequently, political 
violence continued and had its peak, with the ‘Luxor Massacre’ in which 60 tourist were 
killed in 1997 (INP/UNDP 2005; Kienle 1998; Mitchell 2001). Towards the 1999 
elections the political situation improved hardly (Owen 2000), and it can be argued that
11
since (9/11) 2001 the situation became worse. For instance, people are held in prison after 
completing the prison terms, a leading journalist was assaulted in Cairo 2005, new 
terrorist attacks took place in Egypt in 2004 and 2005 (UNDP RBAS 2006), and Islamic 
movements cannot operate freely (Jamal 2006). However, in spite of the political 
deliberalization, broad popular support for democratic governance exists (Inglehart & 
Norris 2003; Jamal 2006; Yousef 2004).
With respect to the economic position of Egypt, another drop in oil-prices in 1998 
was a new blow to the economy (INP/UNDP 2005), but as of 2003, rising numbers of 
tourists, increasing exports of goods and services (fostered by measures such as tariff cuts 
in 2003/2004), and growing FDI helped the economy to grow again substantially and 
poverty is declining (INP/UNDP 2005).
Summarizing, the last decades Egypt seems to have been going through a continuous 
process of economic reform, which however did not equal continuous economic success. 
Only the last few years the economy seems to prosper somewhat more. In the early 
1990s, some processes of democratization took place, but this process stagnated and it 
can be argued that it is more accurate to speak of political deliberalization in the last 
years. Tied up to these economic and political processes are the tensions between the 
regime and the Islamic opposition, which has resulted in violence throughout the last few 
decades, with peaks around 1991/2, 1997 and 2004-5.
Jordan
As other Middle Eastern countries, Jordan experienced economic prosperity in the early 
1980s, grounded in the oil boom and its consequential remittances and aid grants of oil- 
rich Gulf States (Andoni 2001; Miles 2002; MPIC/UNDP/JHFHD 2004; Pfeifer & 
Posusney 2003). Using these resources, the state pursued active policies of increasing 
(public sector) employment of women and agriculture was modernized (Miles 2002; 
Pfeifer & Posusney 2003). The oil-crisis in 1985, however, brought an end to these 
possibilities, but for some years Jordan still made good profit of being Iraq’s major 
transshipper during the Iraq-Iran war. With the end of those hostilities in 1988, the last 
economic prop was gone for Jordan (Andoni 2001). In the late 1980s and the 1990s, trade 
diminished and oil prices dropped again (Brand 2003; MPIC/UNDP/JHFHD 2004;
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Pfeifer & Posusney 2003). The Gulf War (1990-1991) worsened the situation; refugees 
flooded the country, partly because other countries expelled Jordanians, since the 
government refused to join the anti-Iraq coalition. This also led to a drought in aid grants 
from the US and Arab countries, until Germany and Japan restored the crucial flows in
1992 (Andoni 2001; Pfeifer & Posusney 2003; MPIC/UNDP/JHFHD 2004). In this 
period, unemployment and poverty both rose to high levels (Pfeifer & Posusney 2003; 
WorldBank 2005). The economic situation decreased the drive to include women in the 
labor force (Miles 2002), but during the early 1990s the accessibility of micro credits for 
women increased (WorldBank 2005).
To counter the negative economic situation, structural adjustments were set on the 
agenda as of the early nineties, but in the beginning the civil services were still protected 
(Pfeifer & Posusney 2003). Later on, the size of the government sector declined and state 
employment was no viable option anymore to reduce unemployment and poverty (Miles 
2002; MPIC/UNDP/JHFHD 2004; WorldBank 2005). Consequently, decreasing 
subsidies increased living costs and especially the poorest of the poor were hit by SAPs 
(MPIC/UNDP/JHFHD 2004). The economy privatized further under reign of King 
Abdullah and the export of light manufactured products (clothes and textiles) was 
stimulated, which paid off from 2000 onwards (Andoni 2001; Miles 2002). These exports 
were supported by tariff free entry in the US of these products and a FTA to decrease 
barriers further (Andoni 2001). However, the growth in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
was weaker than expected (MPIC/UNDP/JHFHD 2004).
The political situation seems tightly knit to the economic developments. In line with 
the deteriorating economic situation in the 80s and 90s, popular dissatisfaction grew and 
riots took place. To rebuild his authority king Hussein started a trajectory of political 
liberalization in 1989 that lasted to 1994 (Andoni 2001; Brand 2003). A ban on political 
parties was uplifted, parliament was restored and in 1989 the first elections in more than 
20 years were held. The surprising victory of the Muslim brotherhood resulted in a place 
of government for them -  but political instability led to eight governments in nine years 
(Owen 2000). After the first elections, the authority of the royal family was still or even 
more challenged by economic problems and Islamic and Islamist opposition. Another 
wave of democratization was promised and pluralism, a multiparty system and the
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abolishment of martial law were the results. Nonetheless, the opposition grew stronger 
mainly because the 1994 peace treaty with Israel did not find national consensus (Andoni 
2001) -  nor did it bring the expected economic gains (MPIC/UNDP/JHFHD 2004). In the 
second half of the nineties, the political freedoms stabilized or were turned back partly 
(Brand 2003). Following the dead of king Hussein (on the throne from 1953 to 1999), his 
son Abdullah ascended the throne. He cracked down the Islamic resistance movement 
Hamas (Andoni 2001), and it is save to say that to the end of the 1990s, political and 
economical liberalization did not go hand in hand anymore.
Only since the early years of the third millennium, democratization gained ground 
again; the new Ministry of Political Development and Parliamentary affairs was founded 
and ambitious plans were drafted (MPIC/UNDP/JHFHD 2004).Furthermore, Islamic 
movements can operate more freely (Jamal 2006).
The manifestation of Islam in public society during the political liberalized period was 
also found in the women’s movement, that grew stronger in this period; a struggle of 
power took place between Muslim and non-Muslim women (Brand 2003). As of 1992 
Princess Basma became a public figure more and more, especially on women’s issues. In 
1995, at the moment political openness declined, she ‘took control’ over the national 
movement and the organization she led monopolized the foreign donor funds (Brand
2003). Regarding women’s participation in decision-making, an increase is found in the 
number of women in public and private influential positions (e.g. parliament and 
management) during the second half of the 1990s and the years that followed.
The external shocks at the dawn of the millennium (9/11 and US led occupation of 
Iraq) seem to break Jordan’s positive trend. In 2002 FDI were down to the level of 1998, 
tourism declined, leading to staff lay offs and the real GDP/c in 2002 was still below that 
of 1993 (MPIC/UNDP/JHFHD 2004).
The last two decades, Jordan has had it share of economic hardship, but as of about 
2000 the economic tide seems to have turned. This turn took place after continuous 
economic reform. Politically, liberalization was a less continuous process. In the early 
1990s liberalization took place, the last half of the 1990s the situation became grimmer, 
and in the new millennium it seems a new wave of democratization started to take shape. 
During these developments, continuous presence of Islamic orthodox groups as well as
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women’s movement existed, which surfaced the most in the more political liberalized 
period.
Economic and political reform 
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 summarizes the broad trends found for Egypt and Jordan and also gives 
women’s non-agricultural employment figures from our data. Both Egypt and Jordan 
have gone through continuously economic reforms. Sometimes more intense than at other 
moments, in some years with an emphasis on liberalization, in others on privatization. 
Regarding political reform the countries show less similarities, and different periods of 
liberalization, deliberalization and stagnation can be marked. These trends are hardly 
reflected in the raw country-level aggregate figures of women’s employment. Only when 
we distinguish economic privatization and economic liberalization, some relationship 
could be indicated: during or following a period of economic privatization women’s 
employed seems to decline (Egypt 1992-2000 and Jordan 1997-2002). More robust 
conclusions can be drawn after assessing the interrelationship of these developments with 
the district- and micro-level variables.
Results
Major Change: Recent Developments 
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 shows that major changes related to modernization and globalization seem to 
have taken place in Egypt and Jordan the last two decades. Looking at the district-level 
variables we see that in both countries the average level of traditionalism and size of the 
agricultural sector decreased, whereas the average level of economic development and 
gender ratio in secondary of higher education have risen. The average percentage of 
white collar jobs steadily rose in Jordan as well. Only the percentage of white collar jobs 
in Egypt and the average degree of urbanization show no trend in line with the ‘major 
change’ expectations.
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At the micro-level, the average figures point in the same direction. In line with the 
thought of modernization and globalization, the fertility rate, the number of extended 
families, the percentage of people with less than secondary education, large household 
with relatively few women, the percentage of husbands active in agriculture, and the age 
difference within couples all declined. Increased have the percentage of people with 
secondary or higher education, the percentage of employed partners with a white collar 
job, and the age at first delivery. In line with the district-level results, the percentage of 
women living in a city did not steadily rise. Another remarkable result is the spectacular 
rise in unemployment in both countries3
Most surprising however, probably is that the very broad pattern described above is 
not reflected in the employment figures of women. Women’s non-agricultural 
employment rose just a little towards 13 percent in Jordan between 1990 and 1997, but in 
2002 the employment of women declined to 9.4 percent. In Egypt women’s employment 
declined between 1992 and 2000 and it rose again between 2000 and 2005, but in 2005 it 
was still below the level of 1992.
Major Change: District-level influences
The descriptives show which trends are present, but these aggregate figures hardly tell 
anything robustly about which factors influence women’s employment. Therefore we 
turn to the multilevel regression analyses.
To understand how the district-level factors are related to women’s non-agricultural 
employment, we first present the influences of each variables tested separately4 (Table 2), 
then a model including all district-level factors (Table 3, model 1), and last a model 
including micro-level factors as well (Table 3, model 2). Where relevant, we provide 
information about additional models in the text. By including dummies for the different 
countries and years, we can also analyze the development of women’s employment over 
time, controlled for all included variables, by looking at the intercepts and link this to the 
process described in Figure 1.
[Table 2 about here]
3 O n  m arita l s ta tu s n o  tre n d  is fo u n d  e ither, b u t  th is is logical since th e  surveys are ‘ev e r-m arrie d ’ sam ples.
4 In  a tw o-level m o d e l, w ith  co n tro ls  fo r  th e  d iffe ren ces  b e tw e e n  th e  co u n tries  a n d  years.
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Table 2 clearly shows for each of the district-level variables a strong statistically 
significant relationship with women’s employment. Moreover, all relationships point in 
the expected direction: the percentage of white collar jobs, economic development, 
urbanization and the gender ratio in secondary and higher education are positively related 
to women’s employment, whereas the size of the agricultural sector and the level of 
traditionalism show negative signs. This seems to support the general idea of an 
unequivocal positive influence of the major processes of globalization and 
modernization. However, when we measure the effects controlling for the other macro­
level factors, we get a different picture (Table 3).
[Table 3 about here]
The size of the agricultural and the white collar sector as well as the gender ratio in 
education still show significant effects similar to those from the bivariate analyses. 
However, because these factors partly overlap, the coefficient are far smaller for all three: 
the positive effect of white collar jobs declines after control for agriculture and mainly 
the gender ratio; the negative effect of agriculture declines after inclusion of white collar 
jobs; and the positive effect of the gender ratio declines mostly when white collar jobs is 
included. The effect of white collar jobs declines even further when individual controls 
are added. This decline is mostly due to the inclusion of the partner’s occupation and the 
woman’s educational level. This shows that the correlation with the labor market 
structure at the district level can be ascribed partly to the composition of the districts.
The three other district variables show outcomes quite different to the bivariate 
analyses. The level of economic development and traditionalism are not significantly 
related to women’s employment, and of urbanization the direction of the relationship 
changed. The significant effect of economic development disappears after de inclusion of 
the labor market structure variables and the gender ratio in education. This indicates that 
the labor market structure and gender norms are more precise aspects or effects of 
economic development. Economic development is positively related to women’s 
employment, but only through these factors.
Traditionalism had a significant negative effect in the bivariate analyses; however, the 
effect weakens when the gender ratio in education is added to the model. Both variables
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are used to tap into the value change in society; it seems that the gender ratio in education 
is the stronger variable.
Most unexpected is the found effect for urbanization; it has a significantly negative 
effect on women’s employment after control for the other district-level variables. The 
significantly positive effect of urbanization found in the bivariate analyses is related to 
several other variables. It disappears after including the combination of the other district 
variables and educational attainment and living in a city at the individual level. This 
indicates several things. First, part of the positive effect seems to be compositional; more 
higher educated women live in more urbanized district, and these women have a higher 
chance of being employed. Second, living in a urbanized district seem less important than 
living in a city. In other words, the shorter the distance, the better. Third, if  economic 
development is not included in the model, urbanization seems to take its place in 
measuring development in stead of the basic concentration of people. Last, the positive 
effect of ‘uncontrolled’ urbanization seems to work though the labor market structure and 
value change variables. This is comparable with the relationship of economic 
development with women’s employment, as discussed above.
The four points mentioned above explain why the effect of urbanization was not 
significantly positive in Model 2 and 3. However, it even went a step further. It turned 
out to be significantly negatively related to women’s employment. From Model 3, we can 
derive that it is not so that urbanization does not stimulate employment: at the individual 
level living in a city has a positive effect on women’s employment. However, 
urbanization at the district level has a negative effect. We shall discuss this in more detail 
in the last section of this paper.
After control for individual- and district-level characteristics, the country-year 
dummies point at a negative effect on women’s employment of all not measured country- 
level factors taken together. In Egypt the ‘controlled employment level’ was significantly 
higher in 1992 than in 2000 and 2005, and in Jordan the employment level has declined 
steadily. Looking at the country-level development described above, this might mean that 
the continuous economic reforms did decrease women’s chances on employment.
Micro-level stability
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At the individual level, we found positive effects on women’s employment for the 
educational level of women, the occupational class of the partner, living in a city, age at 
the delivery of the first child, and the age of women.5 Significantly negative effects were 
registered for having a partner, having younger and more children, having an unemployed 
husband, having a much older husband, and living in an extended family. Not or hardly 
significant effects were found for living in a polygynous household, the education of the 
partner, and the household’s care ratio.
[Table 4 about here]
These found effects and coefficients represent the average effects in Egypt and Jordan 
for all six surveys. The discrepancy between the trends of the most important variables 
and the trends in women’s employment (see Table 1) is one of the clues that the 
influences of the variables are not constant. For example, take education. It has a very 
strong positive effect on women’s employment opportunities and is the most important 
factor at the individual level, but Table 4 indicates major shifts in its influence. The 
figures show that having had at least some secondary or, even more important, tertiary 
education does increase the chance to be working in both countries at all times. However, 
through time the chance of being employed for a woman with a higher educational level 
has decreased. In Egypt, over 70% of the women with at least some tertiary education 
was employed in 1992. In 2005 this decreases to about half. In Jordan the decline was 
even more serious: almost thirty percent points between 1990 and 2002.
Model 3 (Table 5) shows for which of the micro-level effects the magnitude of the 
influences differ significantly by year. At the left, the main coefficient for each variable is 
given, at the right the difference of the coefficient for 2005/2002 and 2000/1997 with 
those for 1992/1990. In other words, it is tested whether the temporal context has 
influenced the effect of individual level variables.
[Table 5 about here]
Compared to Model 2, the main effects have hardly changed. Two exceptions are 
economic development at the district level and polygynous household at the micro level. 
For economic development we see only just a significantly negative relationship with 
women’s employment. This goes against our expectations, but is comparable to the effect
5 T h e  significance o f  th e  quad ra tic  te rm  ind ica tes  th a t th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  age an d  em p lo y m e n t in  curvelineair.
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found for urbanization, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section. On 
polygyny more will be said below, when we interpret the changing effects at the micro­
level.
The results from the interaction analyses divide the explanatory factors in three 
roughly equal sized groups. First, occupation of partner, living in a city, education of 
partner, and age show no significant differences over time. Having a partner, the care 
ratio, age at first delivery, age difference and extended family make up the second group. 
On these factors at most two significant differences are found. These found differences, 
however, do not point to certain trends or patterns. For example, the effect of having a 
partner is stronger in Egypt in 2000 than in 1992. For 2005 the effect does not differ 
significantly from 1992 or 2000, and in Jordan no significant difference is found. The 
pattern is clearly irregular and does not fit the economic or political reform track either. 
From this we can conclude that the mentioned effects are not completely stable, but a 
substantial interpretation of the instability falls beyond the scope of this study.
The third group comprises the factors on which more clear patterns can be discerned. 
These are having children, living in a polygynous household and educational attainment. 
For the number and age of children, the results indicate that the effect of having children 
has become less strong over the years; in Jordan for three of the six categories on this 
variable we find that the negative effect in 2002 is smaller than in 1990, and for Egypt 
five out of twelve coefficients show significantly smaller effects in 2005/2002 than in 
1992. The non-significant coefficients support the found effect of a declining negative 
influence of having children on women’s employment.
For living in a polygynous household we see that the effect gets remarkably stronger 
over the years in both Egypt and Jordan. Due to the large standard errors the effect is only 
significantly different for Egypt 2005 compared to 2000 and 1992, but the pattern 
suggests an overall increase in the influence of living in a polygynous household.
The effects of education seem to decrease. For Egypt we find that the effect in 2005 is 
significantly less strong than in 1992, and for secondary and tertiary education also less 
strong than in 2000. For Jordan, we find that the effects are smaller in 1997 than in 1990, 
and in 2002 the effects do not differ significantly from either 1990 or 2002. In
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combination with the figures from Tables 1 and 4, this suggests a declining effect of 
educational attainment over the years.
Conclusion & Discussion
The level of women’s non-agricultural employment in Middle Eastern countries is among 
the lowest throughout the world. In this study, we tried to shed some more light on how 
context-level factors are interrelated with women’s employment and micro-level 
explanatory factors. We focused on two ‘myths’ on women’s employment. The first 
being the idea that some grand unequivocal processes exist which push women’s 
employment up and up. Globalization and modernization are the most well-known 
examples of this. Such an idea disregards the complexity of contextual influences and 
obscures our knowledge about the true macro-level influences on women’s employment. 
Second, micro-level influences are (implicitly) considered to be unrelated to their 
temporal and geographical context. This myth withholds us to understand under which 
circumstances micro-level factors have the most effect.
We applied multilevel logistic regression analyses to data on over 60,000 women 
from Egypt and Jordan, both at three points in time, roughly 5 to 8 years apart. This way 
we studied the influence and causal chains of several district-level factors related to 
globalization and modernization, and by using interaction terms with time variables we 
tested whether the effects of micro-level factors changed in the last decades. These results 
were embedded in the economic and political developments of both countries.
Looking at the developments at the individual, household and district level, it seems 
that a continuous process of modernization is taking place: educational levels rise, 
characteristics of traditionalism decline, fertility rates decrease, and the labor market 
structure shifts away from agriculture (and industry). These developments are 
accompanied by non-stop economic reform at the country level. Whereas economic 
liberalization and privatization are rather continuous, political liberalization is not an 
ongoing process. In Egypt and Jordan periods of stagnation and deliberalization were 
found. More surprisingly, women’s (non-agricultural) employment does not show a 
clearly rising trend in either Egypt or Jordan. These results refute the idea that
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globalization and modernization are simple unambiguous processes that steadily fosters 
women’s employment.
Looking at the country-level developments, it is hard to conclude that economic 
reform and political liberalization have had a (single) positive effect on women’s 
employment. For political liberalization no congruent trend with employment was found 
at all and it should be considered to dissect such a broad concept as political liberalization 
in different dimensions (see Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2008). With regard to economic 
reform we have seen that the country-level developments might indicate that economic 
privatization hurts women’s employment, which fits the expectation that the public sector 
offers women more opportunities than the private sector. No positive effect of economic 
liberalization was found; to be more precise, after control for district- and individual- 
level influences it seems more likely that economic reform in general has a negative 
effect. This finding support the critique on liberal economic theories by the GAD 
literature that economic reform in general and SAPs in particular are not gender neutral 
and disadvantage women (Forsythe, Korzeniewicz & Durrant, 2000; Rathgeber, 1990).
Following general ideas from globalization and modernization theories, we would 
expect that industrialization, economic development, urbanization and value change 
(modernization of values) all have positive influences on women’s employment. Simple 
bivariate analyses do corroborate this idea, but further analyses problematize it. After 
control for other macro-level factors and many micro-level ones, we see that 
industrialization (changing labor market structures) and value change 
(detraditionalisation) are both clearly positively related to women’s employment as was 
expected. However, we have shown that the impact of these factors is substantially 
smaller after control for the composition of the districts. First, this corroborates the idea 
that industrialization works partly through educational attainment. Second, it means that 
studying these macro-level factors without taking account of the composition of the 
districts could lead to overestimations of their effects.
Analyses with the variables representing economic development and urbanization 
have shown that these processes have no direct influence on women’s employment but 
have some positive influence through labor market structures, value changes and micro­
level characteristics, as was predicted for economic development. After controlling for
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intervening effects and whether a woman lives in a city, it even seems that urbanization 
(and to some extent economic development as well) has a negative effect. Based on 
Boserup, Jaquette (1982, 270) argues that urbanization ‘cuts women off from their 
kinship support networks (...) and the jobs that are available are often closed to women 
because of sex stereotyping.’ However, this can not explain our results, since we have 
controlled for living in a city at the individual level. A possible explanation for this 
peculiar finding could be that the availability of jobs for women is larger if  more jobs are 
in the vicinity (living in the city), but if  the larger area is also more urbanized the 
competition is higher; a higher female labor supply reduces women’s chances. In others 
words, women living in cities with more other women are relatively disadvantaged 
compared to women living in cities with fewer women (ceteris paribus).
Changes in the effects micro-level factors have on women’s employment, or the 
supposed micro-level stability, was the focus of the second strand of this paper. The 
multilevel model with ‘temporal interactions’ showed a substantial number of micro-level 
factors with changing influences. However, on only three of twelve factors a pattern was 
found in the changes. Overall, the general expectation that micro-level factors become 
more important or that personal versus household characteristics gain leverage are refuted 
by our analyses. The changing effects are more specifically tied up to certain micro-level 
factors.
The weakening negative effect of having children, however, fits the reasoning on 
declining effects of household levels factors. In more traditional times, women are seen 
as the primary caretaker and having children implies staying at home with those children. 
When the traditional norms weaken, it becomes easier for women to diverge from the 
societal blueprint of women’s role and enter the labor market. The declining level of 
traditionalism shown by the descriptives supports this idea.
The influence of educational attainment is declining as was predicted by our two more 
specific expectations. However, based on this study, it is hard to say whether hybrid 
modernization or a gap between education and labor market causes this effect. Additional 
models, including interactions between education and the district-level share of white 
collar jobs or the gender ratio in secondary education, show results confirming both 
hypotheses.
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That women living in polygynous households have become more and more 
disadvantaged over the years, might be due to a retrenchment of polygynous households. 
As we have shown, the percentage of polygynous households declined in both countries 
(especially so in Jordan). These households are probably among the most conservative. 
When the other household shift towards modernization, but the polygynous ones do not 
move, the difference between them grows steadily and the effect of the traditional 
household values on women’s employment increases.
In sum, this study underscores the importance of the context Middle Eastern women 
live in as a determinant of their employment. Studying macro-level characteristics in 
isolation could clearly lead to simplification, overestimation and underestimation of 
macro-level influences. The complexity of the context can hardly be underestimated. As 
we have shown, general processes as modernization and globalization are no unequivocal 
blessing for women’s employment figures, and influences on women’s employment are 
subject to change.
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Figure 1: Economic and political reform trajectories summarized
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Table 1. Developments in Egypt and Jordan between
1990
Women’s non-agricultural employment 12.8
1990 and 2005 
Jordan 
1997 
13.3
2002
9.4
1992
17.7
Egypt
2000
13.3
20
16.5
Number of Children 4.5 3.9 3.7 3.1 2.8 2.6
Married 95.4 96.0 94.8 92.6 92.3 93.3
Extended families 26.0 18.7 16.0 36.7 31.9 25.2
No Education 23.4 9.3 6.2 48.4 43.3 34.6
At least some primary education 22.6 15.5 11.8 25.7 18.3 15.7
At least some secondary education 43.4 53.2 57.6 21.2 30.3 39.3
At least some tertiary education 10.6 21.9 24.4 4.7 8.2 10.4
Care ratio 1 thru 2 5.0 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.8 6.4
Care ratio >2 thru 3 7.2 7.7 9.1 9.7 11.6 13.2
Care ratio >3 thru 5 21.5 29.8 31.0 37.8 43.5 47.3
Care ratio >5 66.3 57.0 54.4 47.3 39.2 33.1
Living in the city 73.7 83.6 79.6 46.3 44.1 41.4
Occupation partner: agricultural 5.6 3.5 2.6 28.3 20.7 16.2
Occupation partner: Blue collar 55.2 52.2 34.9 32.1 33.0 34.8
Occupation partner: lower white collar 22.6 18.8 25.0 22.5 21.1 20.9
Occupation partner: upper white collar 16.0 25.4 24.3 17.1 24.5 23.9
Occupation partner: unemployed 0.5 0.2 13.1 0.0 0.2 4.2
Age difference (partner-woman) 8.7 6.4 6.2 7.4 7.1 6.9
Age of woman at first delivery 20.2 21.1 21.4 20.3 20.7 21.1
Partner: no education 11.0 4.4 3.1 32.4 28.2 21.6
Partner: at least primary 21.5 17.1 11.4 28.9 22.3 19.9
Partner: at least secondary 47.9 49.5 56.4 28.6 36.0 42.9
Partner: at least tertiary 19.5 29.2 29.1 10.0 13.7 15.6
Polygynous Household 5.8 1.4 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.0
District Economic Development 4.37 4.64 4.92 3.19 3.88 4.34
District % Men in agriculture 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.18 0.15
District White collar sector 0.30 0.36 0.40 0.26 0.39 0.34
District Urbanization 0.73 0.83 0.79 0.46 0.44 0.41
District Gender Ratio sec. education 0.57 0.72 0.77 0.47 0.58 0.66
District Traditionalism 3.14 1.78 1.47 1.88 1.55 1.37
Note: the figures are based on weighted samples, whereby the weights comefrom the DHSsurveys
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Table 2. ‘Bivariate’ effects of district-level variables on women’s non- 
agricultural employment
Log odds s.e. Odds ratio
Agriculture -2.733 *** 0.211 0.07
White collar jobs 4.276 *** 0.281 71.95
Economic development 0.381 *** 0.042 1.46
Urbanization 0.800 *** 0.145 2.23
Gender ratio higher 2.565 *** 0.207 13.00
education
Traditionalism -0.496 *** 0.046 0.61
Source: based on data from DHS surveys 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05
Note: Coefficients come from two-level models, with no micro-level fixed effects, 
but including five dummies at the district level for five of the six surveys to control 
for country and time effects. The coefficients for each independent district-level 
variable are derived from a model with only that one of the six explanatory 
variables in the fixed part of the model.
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Table 3. Coefficients o f  multilevel regression on w om en’s non-agricultural employment
M odel 1 
log odds s.e. O.R.
M odel 
log odds
2
s.e. O.R.
Intercept -1.878 -2.429
District-level variance 0.012 * 0.005 1.01 0.023 ** 0.008
D istrict level
Economic development -0.044 0.047 0.96 -0.074 0.058 0.93
% men in agriculture -1.219 *** 0.346 0.30 -1.291 ** 0.413 0.27
W hite collar sector 2.847 *** 0.531 17.24 1.303 * 0.653 3.68
U rbanization -0.783 *** 0.138 0.46 -1.329 *** 0.168 0.26
Gender ratio secondary education 1.320 *** 0.275 3.74 1.135 *** 0.317 3.11
Traditionalism -0.131 0.089 0.88 0.081 0.101 1.08
Country-Year dummies
Egypt 2000 -0.909 *** 0.090 0.40 -1.070 *** 0.111 0.34
Egypt 2005 -0.751 *** 0.085 0.47 -1.148 *** 0.116 0.32
Jordan 1990 -0.419 * 0.179 0.66 -0.895 *** 0.217 0.41
Jordan 1997 -0.792 *** 0.114 0.45 -1.555 *** 0.138 0.21
Jordan 2002 -1.498 *** 0.121 0.22 -2.447 *** 0.163 0.09
Individual level
Education
None - R ef
A t least some prim ary - 0.091 0.077 1.10
A t least some secondary - 1.338 *** 0.123 3.81
A t least some tertiary - 2.775 *** 0.141 16.04
Partner - -0.677 *** 0.063 0.51
Children
None - R ef
1 or 2, only children above 5 - -0.258 * 0.111 0.77
1 or 2, with children below 6 - -0.364 *** 0.072 0.69
3 or 4, only children above 5 - -0.285 * 0.117 0.75
3 or 4, with children below 6 - -0.513 *** 0.099 0.60
5+, only children above 5 - -0.514 *** 0.110 0.60
5+, with children below  6 - -0.725 *** 0.117 0.48
Care ratio
1 thru 2 care consum er per  taker - R ef
M ore than 2 thru 3 - -0.033 0.096 0.97
M ore than 3 thru 5 - -0.090 0.091 0.91
M ore than 5 - -0.246 * 0.110 0.78
Occupation partner
Agricultural - R ef
Blue collar - 0.603 *** 0.092 1.83
Lower white collar - 0.797 *** 0.099 2.22
Upper white collar - 0.951 *** 0.095 2.59
U nemployed - 0.951 *** 0.136 2.59
City - 0.137 ** 0.051 1.15
Age at first delivery - 0.067 *** 0.007 1.07
Age difference; partner is ...
Younger - 0.145 0.098 1.16
Same age thru 3 older - R ef
4 thru 8 years older - -0.021 0.045 0.98
9 thru 15 years older - -0.247 *** 0.044 0.78
A t least 16years older - -0.335 *** 0.093 0.72
Education partner
None - R ef
A t least some prim ary - -0.201 * 0.088 0.82
A t least some secondary - 0.028 0.082 1.03
A t least some tertiary - -0.016 0.091 0.98
Polygynous household - -0.099 0.171 0.91
Extended family - -0.139 * 0.065 0.87
Age - 0.387 *** 0.031 1.47
Age (Quadratic term) - -0.005 *** 0.000 1.00
Source: DHS: Egypt 2005, 2000, 1992; Jordan 2002, 1997, 1990; 
N=61,620; Em ployed (1): n=9,258 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
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Table 4. The percentage of women non-agriculturally employed according to
their educational attainment
90/92 97/00 02/05
Jordan No education 4.5 7.1 2.8
At least some primary 6.3 6.0 2.2
At least some secondary 9.9 6.3 3.8
At least some tertiary 57.0 37.9 27.9
Egypt No education 6.3 4.2 7.1
At least some primary 8.7 5.4 6.7
At least some secondary 42.7 23.4 19.5
At least some tertiary 71.9 55.9 51.6
Source: based on data from DHS surveys
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Table 5. Coefficients o f  multilevel regression on w om en’s non-agricultural em ployment w ith tim e dummies
M odel 3 Difference in coefficient com pared to Egypt 1992 
or Jordan 19903
M ain log odds s.e. Egypt
2000 2005
Jordan 
1997 2002
Intercept -2.386
District-level variance 0.017 * 0.007
D is tric t level
Economic development -0.108 * 0.053 - - - -
%men in agriculture -1.232 ** 0.412 - - - -
W hite collar sector 1.379 * 0.627 - - - -
U rbanization -1.345 *** 0.169 - - - -
Gender ratio secondary education 1.165 *** 0.308 - - - -
Traditionalism 0.045 0.098 - - - -
C o u n try -Y ear dum m ies
Egypt 2000 -1.160 *** 0.125 - - - -
Egypt 2005 -1.133 *** 0.126 - - - -
Jordan 1990 -0.863 *** 0.208 - - - -
Jordan 1997 -1.286 *** 0.154 - - - -
Jordan 2002 -2.547 *** 0.194 - - - -
In d iv idua l level
Education
None
A t least some prim ary
R ef
0.044 0.095 -0.031 -0.317* -0.650* -0.597
A t least some secondary 1.117 *** 0.104 -0.154 -0.998*# -1.069* -0.357
A t least some tertiary 2.533 *** 0.128 0.136 -0.545 *# -1.268* -0.509
Partner -0.748 *** 0.065 -0.473* -0.309 -0.130 -0.433
Children
None
1 or 2, only children above 5
R ef
-0.253 * 0.121 0.619* 0.443* 0.165 0.894*
1 or 2, with children below 6 -0.323 *** 0.076 -0.121 -0.067 0.082 0.416
3 or 4, only children above 5 -0.305 ** 0.104 0.974* 1.034* -0.256 0.386
3 or 4, with children below 6 -0.492 *** 0.078 0.476* 0.299 0.143 0.585*
5+, only children above 5 -0.475 *** 0.123 0.415 0.908* 0.392 0.504
5+, with children below  6 -0.599 *** 0.102 0.331 0.503 0.294 0.733*
Care ratio
1 thru 2 care consum er per  taker  
M ore than 2 thru 3
R ef
-0.071 0.080 -0.392 -0.322 0.340 -0.693*#
M ore than 3 thru 5 -0.145 0.089 -0.251 -0.305 0.375 -0.374
M ore than 5 -0.281 ** 0.105 0.016 -0.186 0.700 -0.160
Occupation partner
Agricultural 
Blue collar
R ef
0.585 *** 0.089
Lower white collar 0.771 *** 0.102 - - - -
Upper white collar 0.913 *** 0.098 - - - -
U nemployed 0.936 *** 0.130 - - - -
City 0.142 ** 0.050 - - - -
Age at first delivery 0.067 *** 0.005 0.030* 0.006 -0.057* -0.007
Age difference; partner is ...
Younger 0.150 0.078 0.085 -0.192 0.249 0.550
Same age thru 3 older 
4 thru 8 years older
R ef
-0.014 0.043 0.113 0.085 0.171 0.111
9 thru 15 years older -0.252 *** 0.046 0.208 0.186 0.200 -0.128
A t least 16years older -0.366 *** 0.085 0.745* 0.253# -0.037 0.158
Education partner
None
A t least some prim ary
R ef
-0.219 ** 0.082
- - - -
A t least some secondary -0.026 0.079 - - - -
A t least some tertiary -0.021 0.084 - - - -
Polygynous household -0.781 ** 0.275 -0.184 -2.511 *# -1.189 -1.888
Extended family -0.152 * 0.046 0.014 -0.195 -0.514* -0.235
Age 0.410 *** 0.031 - - - -
Age (Quadratic term) -0.005 *** 0.000 - - - -
Source: DHS: Egypt 2005, 2000, 1992; Jordan 2002, 1997, 1990; 
N=61,620; Em ployed (1): n=9,258 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
- m icro-level variables showing no significantly differing coefficients
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Appendix A
Country Year Number of 
districts
Number of 
women
Response rate 
household
survey (%)
Response rate 
women’s 
survey (%)
Survey Source
Egypt 1992 21 9,864 98 99 DHS
Egypt 2000 26 15,573 99 99.5 DHS
Egypt 2005 26 19,474 98.9 99.5 DHS
Jordan 1992 8 6,461 97.0 89.2 DHS
Jordan 1997 12 5,548 96.6 96.2 DHS
Jordan 2002 12 6,006 99.0 97.6 DHS
Total 103 62,926
Source: DHS country reports: http://www.measuredhs.com/accesssurveys/search/start.cfm. accessed April 2008
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Appendix B
Variables
Name Description Categories or range
Macro-level variables
White collar The percentage of people active in white collar A scale with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1.
sector jobs as a percentage of all employed people
Agriculture The percentage of men (husbands) aged 25-49 
having an agricultural occupation
A scale with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1.
Economic The level of economic development measured A scale with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1.
development by household assets
Urbanization The percentage of people living in cities A scale with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1.
Gender ratio The percentage of women divided by the A scale with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1.
education percentage of men aged 25-49 having at least 
completed secondary education
Traditionalism The level of traditionalism based on family 
structure variables
A scale with a minimum of 0 ranging to 5.12.
Micro-level variables
Education Educational attainment: highest level (1) no education, (2) at least primary education, (3) at least 
some secondary education, (4) at least completed secondary 
education
Partner Marital status (0) no partner, (1) has partner
Children Number and age of children (1) none, (2) 1 or 2 children, including children under the 
age of 6, (3) 1 or 2 children, only older than 5, (4) 3 or 4, 
under 6 (5) 3 or 4, above 5, (6) 5 or more, under 6, (7) 5 or 
more, above 5
Care ratio Number of household members per women (1) 1 thru 2 care consumers per caretaker, (2) more than 2
aged 15-49 thru 3, (3) more than 3 thru 5, (4) more than 5
Occupation
partner
Type of job of partner (1) agricultural, (2) blue collar, (3) lower white collar, (4) 
upper white collar, (5) unemployed
City Whether the woman is living in a city (0) no, (1) yes
Age at first 
delivery
The woman’s age at the delivery of her 
firstborn child
Interval measured in years
Age difference Age difference between partners; the male 
partner is ...
(1) younger), (2) same age thru 3 year older, (3) 4 thru 8 
years older, (4) 9 thru 15 years older, (5) at least 16 years 
older
Education Educational attainment of partner; highest level (1) no education, (2) at least primary education, (3) at least
partner some secondary education, (4) at least completed secondary 
education
Polygynous Presence of a polygynous relation in the 
household
(0) no, (1) yes
Extended family Living in an extended household (not nuclear) (0) no, (1) yes
Age Age Interval measured in years
Age (quadratic) Age’s quadratic term Interval measured in squared years
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